The Effect of Islamic Contracts of Mudaraba and Rent from Two Aspects of Desired Productivity and Job Satisfaction: Audit Firms’ Staff Viewpoints

Nazemi, Amin; Faghihi, Ali

doi:10.29252/aapc.2.4.1

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Volume 2, Issue 4 (1-2018)

aapc 2018, 2(4): 1-35

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The Effect of Islamic Contracts of Mudaraba and Rent from Two Aspects of Desired Productivity and Job Satisfaction: Audit Firms’ Staff Viewpoints

Amin Nazemi

¹, Ali Faghihi²

1- Assistant Professor of Accounting, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran (Corresponding author) , aminnazemi@gmail.com
2- Master of Accounting, Shiraz University, Iran (ali.faghihi69@yahoo.com)

Abstract: (4156 Views)

The aim of this research is to evaluate the capacity of mudaraba and rent contract in keeping expected productivity of employers with desirable job satisfaction of employees to solve some problems in agency contracts in audit firms. To do this, first the audit firms based on their revenues were classified to small, medium and large firms. Also the employer's questionnaire for measurement of productivity and employee's questionnaire for measurement of job satisfaction were prepared. Then the validity and reliability of questionnaires was evaluated. Among the 94 samples including 30 institutes which include 30 employers, 60 employees answer the questionnaires. This research was conducted in 2015.
The results indicate that mudaraba increases productivity and job satisfaction and the rent decreases productivity and job satisfaction. The evaluation of the productivity components (ability, clarity, evaluation, incentive, help, and validity) and job satisfaction components (payment, promotion, colleagues and supervisors, organization justice) show that mudaraba does not improve all variables but decreases merit payment and promotion and in relation to validity is ineffective. Also rent contract does not decrease all variables but increases promotion and ability and like mudaraba is ineffective on validity. Also evaluation of demographic variables (sex, age, academic degree, organization size, organizational position and job experience) does not show significant differences, except that among large firms to small and medium firms just in productivity in rent condition. If the results of research along with economic environment is investigated, it would be determined that mudaraba and even rent contract find meaning in Islamic environment; so the weaknesses of mudaraba in merit payment, promotion opportunities and validity in such an atmosphere that makes fair flow of wealth and prevents exclusivity, can be removed. Therefore the creation of Islamic environment and avoiding market monopoly in audit firms is suggested in this research.

Keywords: Mudaraba, Rent, Agency Theory, Human Productivity, Job Satisfaction and Audit Firms.

Full-Text [PDF 228 kb] (1439 Downloads)

Type of Study: Research | Subject: Special
Received: 2017/08/30 | Accepted: 2017/10/24 | Published: 2018/01/4

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‎ 10.29252/aapc.2.4.1

‎ 20.1001.1.24767166.1396.2.4.1.2

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Nazemi A, Faghihi A. The Effect of Islamic Contracts of Mudaraba and Rent from Two Aspects of Desired Productivity and Job Satisfaction: Audit Firms’ Staff Viewpoints. aapc 2018; 2 (4) :1-35
URL: http://aapc.khu.ac.ir/article-1-335-en.html

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